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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner filed an application for authority July 
12, 1988 (R0001-0045) wherein in paragraph 5a the applicant 
sought contract authority to haul general commodities to all 
points in Utah and all points within Utah on behalf of Trans West 
Shippers Association, 1122 West 150 North, Orem, Utah, 84057. 
The application was signed by H. G. Roberts on behalf of D and H 
Real Estate Company, as president, on July 11, 1988. 
2. The applicant is D and H Real Estate Company, dba D 
and H Trucking. The application was given Case No. 88-960-01 by 
the Public Service Commission. 
3. With the application, the applicant attached a 
"Contract Carrier Agreement" dated the 5th day of January, 1980, 
by and between Trans West Shippers Association of Salt Lake City 
("Shipper"), a nonprofit corporation, and PBI Freight Service, 
Inc. ("Carrier"), a corporation of Orem, Utah. Paragraph 4 of 
said contract (R0013), state that the carrier was to be 
considered at all times an independent contractor. The contract 
agreement was executed by Owen Thomas for Trans West Shippers 
Association, and for PBI Freight by H. G. Roberts. 
4. An amendment to the contract is also filed as an 
attachment (R0022) wherein D and H Real Estate Company, a Utah 
corporation, dba D and H Trucking, was added as a carrier to the 
initial agreement, dated January 5, 1980. This document, dated 
May 1, 1988, was executed by Charles Coombs on behalf of Trans 
West Shippers Association and for PBI Freight and D and H Real 
Estate Company, dba D and H Trucking, by H. G. Roberts. The 
fleet safety program and driver requirements for PBI Freight were 
filed as D and H Trucking's fleet safety program and the notation 
in agreement that D and H would be for PBI where applicable 
throughout the agreement (R0026). 
5. Trans West Shippers Association is a nonprofit Utah 
corporation formed and operated to obtain the best transportation 
service at the lowest reasonable price for its members. At the 
time of the filing of the application, there was one known 
shipment scheduled for July 15, 1988 from Orem to St. George 
(R0040) (R0041). 
6. On July 27, 1988, a notice was sent to D and H 
Trucking, 960 North 1200 West, Orem, Utah, 84057, wherein the 
Division of Public Utilities requested of the applicant a copy of 
its contract with the caveat that the Commission may at any time 
"reject contracts filed with it which do not comply with this 
chapter and Commission rules", citing § 54-6-34 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) The notice further quoted the case of McCarty v. Public 
Service Commission, 111 Utah 489 184 P.2d 220 (1947) wherein the 
Court stated: 
There is no provision for contracts to be 
issued for brokerage of shipments or shipper 
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associations. You must define in your 
application for contract authority what 
specific shipper you intend to utilize and the 
specific items and rates to be utilized. 
(R0046) 
7. The attorney for the Motor Carrier Section, 
Division of Public Utilities, on September 15, 1988, gave Notice 
of Hearing to the applicant and their attorney, Mr. Lon Rodney 
Kump, noting that the hearing would be September 28, 1988, at 
9:00 a.m. in the Heber Wells Building before an Administrative 
Law Judge. 
8. On September 21, 1988, a memorandum was sent to the 
Public Service Commission by the Division of Public Utilities 
setting forth the view of the Division of Public Utilities on 
this case wherein it was set forth in II paragraph 2 that the 
Division of Public Utilities viewed this application as a request 
for approval of an "open ended contract authority". The Division 
of Public Utilities stated (R0050, R0051): 
We view the scenario as one more akin to common 
carrier authority as indeed they hold 
themselves out to the general public. We use 
the term "they" advisedly as the applicant and 
shipper while not identical legal entities 
share the principal . . . . 
In the memorandum at subparagraph 4 on page 2, the 
Division of Public Utilities further states: 
Assuming a grant as prayed, those motor 
carriers holding common carrier certificates of 
convenience and necessity would be severely 
prejudiced in their inability to compete on 
similar terms. 
9. On September 26, 1988, a letter from Mr. Tinker of 
the Attorney General's Office, was issued authorizing James L. 
Barker as a Special Assistant Attorney General in this case, a 
_ A _ 
copy of page 209-1-10 of the Motor Carrier Guide, CCH Explana-
tion, was put in the record by Mr. Barker, i.e., subparagraph 
004, was included noting that in Interstate Commerce Commission 
practice, the Commission could decide "to convert all or part of 
the contract carrier permit or permits to a certificate if found 
that the carriers operation did not conform to the operations of 
a motor contract carrier and were those of a motor common 
carrier." (R0053) 
10. A hearing was held September 28, 1988 under Docket 
No. 88-960-01. Prior to taking evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge concluded that there was a need for modification and re-
publication of the application, as the original publication did 
not properly notice all persons potentially affected. 
Accordingly, a Conditional Order of Dismissal was issued on 
November 18, 1989, providing that the applicant would have ten 
days in which to re-publish or have its application dismissed. 
The Order of the Public Service Commission confirming the 
Administrative Law Judge, Kent Walgren, dated November 18, 1988, 
provided at page 3: 
The notice of filing shall specify that Trans 
West Shippers Association includes potentially 
every citizen and commercial enterprise in 
Utah. In addition, if it is applicant's 
intention to be involved in the solicitation of 
Association members, that fact shall also be 
disclosed. 
It was further provided: 
In the event applicant elects not to re-publish 
within the time specified, its application 
shall be automatically dismissed without 
further notice or proceedings. (R0057-0060) 
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11. In a memorandum from Mr. Habel, Manager of the 
Motor Carriers Section to the Public Service Commission, dated 
December 5, 1988, the Public Service Commission was notified that 
the applicant had failed to re-publish a notice pursuant to the 
November 18, 1988 Order of the Public Service Commission and 
recommended the application be cancelled. Copies of this 
memorandum went to the attorney for applicant and directly to the 
applicant. (R0062) 
12. On December 16, 1988, at 2:41 p.m., the applicant 
requested a review and a petition for rehearing before the Public 
Service Commission. (R0067-R0Q81) 
13. On January 5, 1989, the Public Service Commission 
issued an order denying the rehearing in Docket No. 88-960-01 
wherein the Public Service Commission, at pages 1 and 2 (R0085-
86), indicated the following issues were reviewed. 
Although applicant raises numerous issues in 
its request for rehearing, the essence of its 
position is that it published its notice of 
filing in technical conformance with the rule 
R750-150-3. D.2; that there were no public 
protests; that it is fit, willing and able to 
provide the service; and that, therefore, the 
application must be summarily granted. 
Applicant ignores the Commission's duty to 
assure the application is in the public 
interest. 
The Commission concluded that applicant's 
notice of filing had not reasonably 
communicated to potential protestants the 
substance of the application and required re-
publication. It is to that issue and the 
question of public interest that this order is 
addressed. 
In the conclusions of law, at page 4 of said order 
(R0088), the Commission further states: 
Although applicant technically complied with 
the requirements of Rule R750-150-3.D2., the 
Commission may require further notification 
pursuant to Rules R750-15-3.D5 and R750-150-
3.D.5. Parties having a potential interest in 
a proceeding are entitled to receive reasonable 
and adequate notice of that proceeding. In 
this instance, applicant's notice of filing did 
not reasonably and adequately provide notice of 
the proceeding to potential protestants. 
The Commission, at paragraph 2 of said conclusions of law, 
further stated: 
The Commission entered no findings or 
conclusions as to whether the applicant was 
consistent with the public interest, but did 
conclude that prior to a hearing on that issue, 
potentially interested parties were entitled to 
notice of the proceeding. 
The Commission dismissed the application without prejudice and 
provided that applicant could refile its application at any time 
(R0088-89). 
14. On February 1, 1989, at 2:26 p.m., the applicant 
filed on a petition for review before the Supreme Court with the 
Public Service Commission. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Public Service Commission Did Not Err or Exceed its 
Authority in its Order of November 18, 1988 Requiring the 
Applicant to Modify and Re- publish Notice of its 
Application So That Motor Carriers Could be Properly 
Notified of the Nature of the Business Applicant Was to 
Engage In As a Proposed Contract Carrier. 
II. The Public Service Commission Did Not Erroneously Interpret 
and Apply the Law, But Acted Properly in Ordering the 
Modification and Re-publication of Notice and Further 
Ordering That Should Applicant Decide Not to Re-publish 
That Its Application Would Be Dismissed Without Prejudice, 
and Said Action by the Public Service Commission Was Not 
Arbitrary or Capricious, Nor Based on an Erroneous 
Interpretation of the Law. 
III. Applicant Was Not Substantially Prejudiced by the 
Administrative Action Under Paragraph 4 of § 63-46b-16 of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act on Appellate Court 
Review of an Administrative Order. 
ARGUMENT I. 
The Public Service Commission Did Not Err or Exceed its 
Authority in its Order of November 18f 1988 Requiring the 
Applicant to Modify and Re-publish Notice of its Application So 
That Motor Carriers Could be Properly Notified of the Nature of 
the Business Applicant Was to Engage In As a Proposed Contract 
Carrier 
PBI Freight has acted as an interstate commerce carrier 
for many years and is an experienced and able carrier. 
Therefore, D and H Trucking, using the same principles is in like 
stature. 
The company (PBI Freight) is recognized as a leader in 
the "You Load, We Haul" type of carriage where the carrier will 
park a trailer at a residence, allow the resident to fill and 
pack the van, and then the carrier transports the trailer by 
tractor to the point of destination. However, the proposal 
before the Public Service Commission was different in that the 
application was for contract authority with Trans West Shippers 
Association. This association was started in part through the 
efforts of the principal of the applicant (Hardy G. Roberts) with 
the concept that members of the shippers association would place 
goods with the Trans West Shippers Association, and when 
sufficient commodities were assembled for a "haul", D and H 
Trucking would then transport them for hire. The problem, as 
viewed by the Division of Public Utilities (see paragraph 8 of 
the Statement of Facts) was that any person or entity could join 
the association for a modest fee, and in this "pooling 
arrangement", the applicant, (D and H Trucking) here, would then 
transport a truckload or less than a truckload of the pooled 
commodities. Trans West would be responsible for negotiating and 
collecting the charges for the haul from the shipper-members and 
would remit a percentage of the net revenues collected to the 
carrier, D and H Trucking. This appeared to the Division of 
Public Utilities to be a brokerage type service, and it could be 
argued that this essentially would allow the contract carrier to 
haul commodities that would normally be taken by a common carrier 
as a result of this pooling arrangement through the Trans West 
Shippers Association (R0046). 
Contrary to the arguments of counsel for applicant, 
there was no contact or information between the Public Service 
Commission and the Division of Public Utilities other than the 
memorandum of September 21, 1988 sent from Mr. Creer's office and 
under the signature of R. William Habel raising questions 
relative to documentation, insurance and the matters mentioned in 
the Statements of Fact, paragraphs 7 and 8. After a proffer on 
September 28, 1988 by counsel for the applicant, the 
Administrative Law Judge ruled from the bench that a new notice 
would have to be published properly notifying all potentially 
impacted that the applicant was really seeking an "open ended" 
contract authority rather than the traditional contract authority 
wherein one carrier and one shipper are involved. Further, the 
Public Service Commission determined in paragraph 3 (R0087) that 
nothing in the record indicated that the Administrative Law Judge 
was prejudiced by the Division of Public Utilities. Further, the 
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Public Service Commission (R0088), at paragraph 2, concluded that 
prior to any hearing on the substantive issue of public interest, 
a re-publication would be required so that potentially interested 
parties would have notice of the proceeding. In view of the 
proffer made by the attorney for applicant, this requirement by 
the Administrative Law Judge is well founded. Said procedural 
requirement for notice is not contrary to the cases cited for 
attorney applicant in the docketing statement (R0105). Further, 
it may well be concluded on the merits of the case that the 
applicant is attempting a procedure which could be viewed as a 
subterfuge similar to that as found in Thomas J. Peck & Sons v. 
Public Service Commission of the State of Utah, 700 P.2d 1119 
(Utah 1985). There the Court found that Peck's purchasing 
concrete at the source of haul, taking it to CPC and then 
charging the cost of the cement, plus transportation, was a 
subterfuge to get around the requirement that those who haul for 
hire must be registered and certificated by Public Service 
Commission. The Court there found that the "ownership" by Peck 
of the concrete was merely a contrivance to get around the Public 
Service Commission. 
It is Respondent's contention that the applicant is 
seeking an authority to haul for a shippers' association to which 
anyone may belong such that applicant would enjoy all the 
benefits of common carriage while avoiding the costs and 
liabilities of same, thus gaining a distinctly unfair advantage 
over lawfully certificated common carriers with which it would 
compete for business. 
. 1 0 -
In the case of Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah 
Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051-1052 (1981), the 
Court stated: 
It is therefore, the responsibility of this 
court to determine whether the Commission acted 
outside its jurisdiction in excess of its 
lawful powers, or in a manner and capricious 
and therefore without legal justification. To 
enable this Court to determine whether an order 
is arbitrary and capricious, the Commission 
must make findings of fact that are suffici-
ently detailed to apprise the parties and court 
of the basis for the Commission's decision 
. . . • For this court to sustain an order, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
demonstrate that the Commission has properly 
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and 
has properly applied the governing rules of law 
to those findings. Ultimate findings . . . 
must be sustained if there are adequate 
supporting findings to support them and there 
is substantial evidence to support the 
findings. 
In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission 
of Utah, 720 P.2d 1323 (1986) at page 1378, the Court said: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a 
proper determination by an administrative 
agency . . . . 
The Court then affirms this concept that it is necessary so that 
the Court can protect the parties and the public from arbitrary 
and capricous administrative actions. 
In the case at hand, detailed findings were set forth 
by the Public Service Commission (R0086-88) in its order 
requiring that the applicant modify and re-publish it notice the 
Public Service Commission's findings are sufficiently detailed 
and in compliance with the Court's rule as set down in Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission 
(supra), and the order should be sustained by this Court. 
- 11 -
ARGUMENT II. 
The Public Service Commission Did Not Erroneously 
Interpret and Apply the Law, But Acted Properly 
In Ordering the Re-publication of Notice and Further 
Ordering That Should Applicant Decide Not To Re-publish 
That its Application Would Be Dismissed Without 
Prejudice, and Said Action by the Public Service 
Commission Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious. 
Applicant argues that because the application and its 
attachments and the financial statements were in a position to be 
reviewed by the Division of Public Utilities, a temporary 
authority should have been recommended by the Division of Public 
Utilities and issued by the Public Service Commission and that 
the judge should have allowed applicant to put on evidence. 
However, the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to 
allow the applicant to put on evidence was not prejudicial and 
any hearing on the merits would have been premature, as the order 
requiring re-publication was a procedural and notice requirement 
necessarily preceding any hearing on the fitness of the carrier 
or the public interest to be served or not served. 
It is well settled in Utah law that if there are 
procedural errors, one cannot proceed to reach matters on the 
merit of a case. In this case, Judge Walgren determined that 
before he could proceed to hear evidence or witnesses or make any 
determination relative to public interest or the "fitness" of the 
applicant or allow any cross-examination based on the application 
and its attachments, that a new and amended notice would have to 
be published. The Judge allowed ten days for re-publication or a 
decision to re-publish, and the Judge's actions, conclusions and 
recommendation to the Public Service Commission that the 
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application be dismissed if applicant failed to re-publish, was 
not arbitrary or capricious. The Public Service Commission has a 
responsibility under §§ 54-6-1 through 54-6-50 that requires it 
to conclude before the granting of any temporary or permanent 
authority that the applicant is not only financially able to 
perform the service for which he is applying, but that the 
service would be in the public interest and that those who may 
desire to protest the granting of said authority have a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to do so. The fact that this application 
had no protests filed against it is meaningless since its notice 
was seriously defective. The very need for the re-publication as 
concluded by Judge Walgren indicates that in his judgment, the 
proper parties that may have wanted to protest under the 
provisions of the Motor Carrier Act, effective October 1, 1966, 
did not receive adequate notice that this potential service to be 
provided by the applicant was one which would take substantial 
traffic from the common carriers authorized within the State of 
Utah. That conclusion was arrived at by the Judge based on the 
proffer of attorney, the application and other documents on file 
prior to the hearing on September 28, 1988. 
Petitioner cites Spreader Specialists, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 738 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987), and Big K 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 
1984) for the proposition that existing competition is not a 
basis for denial of an application for authority. Respondent 
here states that cases are not on point or relevant to the issues 
before this Court in this case. This was a decision the 
Administrative Law Judge made on matters one step before any 
substantive issues of fitness, competition or matters requiring 
witnesses or testimony. 
Absent any explanation by way of proffer on the part of 
the applicant at the time of the September 28, 1988 hearing that 
aided the Administrative Law Judge to conclude that interested 
parties had been given notice, it was the duty of the judge and 
the Public Service Commission to issue an order denying the 
application, if the applicant failed to re-publish. For the 
applicant to show that Commission acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner would require that it show that the recommenda-
tion of Judge Walgren was without rational basis or was based 
upon personal prejudice, ignoring essential facts made in the 
proffer. It is submitted that the record is wholly vacant of any 
such evidence. On this basis, this Court should conclude that 
the order as entered January 5, 1989 was well supported by 
findings, conclusions of law and was without prejudice, and was 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
ARGUMENT III. 
Applicant Was Not Substantially Prejudiced by the 
Administrative Action Under Paragraph 4 of 
§ 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act on Appellate Court Review of an Administrative Order 
The sub-section states as follows: 
(4) The appellant court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by an 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by an statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-making 
body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(ii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) [is] otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
Respondent respectfully submits the Court should not 
grant the petitioner relief because the record is absent any 
showing there has been a violation of any of the provisions in 
(a) through (h) that would justify an adverse finding on 
appellate review of the Public Service Commission's order of 
November 18, 1988. 
CONCLUSION 
The attorneys for Defendant and Respondent request that 
the report and order of the Public Service Commission, dated 
January 5, 1989 be sustained in that the application of the 
applicant, D and H Real Estate Company, dba D and H Trucking was 
1 C _ 
dismissed based upon the volitional determination of the 
applicant not to re-publish, as required in the order, which was 
self-executing, said order being entered without prejudice and 
allowing the applicant to reapply at any time; said order being 
based on a rational determination of the Administrative Law Judge 
and not based on any preconceived prejudice nor based upon any 
arbitrary or capricious determination by the Administrative Law 
Judge. Further, there is no basis for an adverse appellate 
ruling based on Utah Code Ann. § 64 46b-16, subsections (4a) 
through (4h). 
R V PAUL VAN DAM 
Lttdrney General 
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